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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) make a good case for calling into question the “invertebrate 
dogma” of ignoring invertebrates (especially arthropods) as potential subjects of ethical concern. 
M&P’s case is built on evidence of convergent evolution for cognitive capacities, including 
sentience. in vertebrates and a diverse variety of invertebrates. This evidence suggests that to be 
consistent with the treatment of vertebrates many invertebrates are candidates for welfare 
consideration. However, like Monsó & Osuna-Mascaró (2020), I have some concerns about this 
consistency approach. Like Figdor (2020 and forthcoming), I think an evolutionarily inclusive 
ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical, scala 
naturae and human-centered views of the biological world. In particular, we need to question 
lingering anthropocentric assumptions. 
In animal ethics we are frequently concerned with questions about how we as human 
beings should behave toward other species and what our ethical obligations toward them may 
or may not be. This makes sense because we can only make ethical decisions for ourselves. 
However, a form of ethical anthropocentrism is still there when we frame these questions in 
terms of our granting moral status to them, as if we have some special authority or ownership 
over moral status—either that we are the ones who get to grant it, or, more often, that we are 
the measure of it. Despite commitment to secularism and Darwinism, this way of thinking is 
implicit in much of the animal ethics literature, and M&P seem to adopt it, too, by pursuing the 
standard strategy of pointing to apparent cognitive and other similarities between various 
invertebrates and adult human beings. This is fine, as far as it goes, for getting reluctant human 
beings -- with their anachronistic assumptions about invertebrates and cognitive-affective biases 
M&P describe -- to even consider invertebrates as potential subjects of ethical concern. But 
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Monsó & Osuna-Mascaró point out the numerous problems with extending standard “widening-
the-circle” approaches in animal ethics to the radically un-human-like ways of life of many 
invertebrate species. If ants or termites matter ethically, that can’t be because we can fit them 
neatly into individualistic welfare-centered ethical theories modelled on human beings. 
As Figdor (2018, 2020, forthcoming) argues, abandoning a human-centered scala naturae 
also entails abandoning the assumption that similarity to human beings should be the standard 
for judging other species -- both their cognitive capacities and their moral status. This is easy to 
see using Woodhall’s (2015) analogy between anthropocentrism (Kopnina et al. 2018) and 
androcentrism. The strategy of beginning with human beings, identifying traits that confer moral 
status on us, and then expanding this outward to other species that share the relevant traits is 
analogous to taking (white) cisgendered males as the normative standard and expanding 
outward to other human beings in terms of how they measure up to that standard. 
A non-human-centered, evolutionarily inclusive ethics needs to reject the notion that 
human beings are the measure of all things. We need to question common intuitions about what 
matters ethically and to be more humble about our understanding of the nature and scope of 
ethical value:  What we as human beings typically take to be of ethical concern need not exhaust 
all that is of ethical concern; what we typically care about need not be all that should be cared 
about.  
This has implications for the notion of moral status. Our parochial intuitions about what 
might distort our view about which organisms are worthy of ethical concern just as much as the 
cognitive-affective biases M&P describe. I hence agree with Levy (2020) that we should not take 
it for granted that sentience is necessary for moral status. The same applies, however, to Levy’s 
proposal that it is cognition, not sentience, that is necessary. Neither may be necessary. This is 
not to say that sentience and cognition don’t matter, or that there aren’t good arguments for 
emphasizing sentience as a basis for moral status; it is just that we need to reflect more on why 
we should take sentience (or whatever it is) as the measure for moral status and be sure we are 
not simply assuming that our own species is the moral yardstick. 
Similar issues arise about the practical implications of including invertebrates in our 
ethical deliberations. Browning & Veit (2020) are quite right that acknowledging the moral status 
of invertebrates needn’t necessarily entail radical changes to human behavior. However, we must 
be careful not to settle for rationalizations based on human-centered conceptions of what is “too 
demanding”. Ethical revolutions may appear “too demanding” for those whose practices come 
into question; so we do have to take it seriously that understanding our moral obligations to 
invertebrates may have quite radical implications for human practices. Some (e.g., Carruthers, 
2007) take anything that would entail radical changes in human behavior as evidence that 
conclusions like those of M&P are absurd. This shows how blatant human anthropocentrism can 
be; but we need to be careful to avoid the more subtle forms of anthropocentrism, too. 
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